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An outbreak of serogroup W-135 meningococcal dis-
ease occurred during the 2000 Hajj in Saudi Arabia.
Disease was reported worldwide in Hajj pilgrims and their
close contacts; however, most cases were identified in
Saudi Arabia. Trends in Saudi meningococcal disease were
evaluated and the epidemiology of Saudi cases from this
outbreak described. Saudi national meningococcal disease
incidence data for 1990 to 2000, were reviewed; cases
from January 24 to June 5, 2000 were retrospectively
reviewed. The 2000 Hajj outbreak consisted of distinct
serogroup A and serogroup W-135 outbreaks. Of 253 iden-
tified cases in Saudi Arabia, 161 (64%) had serogroup
identification; serogroups W-135 and A caused 93 (37%)
and 60 (24%) cases with attack rates of 9 and 6 cases per
100,000 population, respectively. The 2000 Hajj outbreak
was the first large serogroup W-135 meningococcal dis-
ease outbreak identified worldwide. Enhanced surveillance
for serogroup W-135, especially in Africa, is essential to
control this emerging epidemic disease.
M
eningococcal disease, caused by the bacterium
Neisseria meningitidis, results in meningitis and sep-
sis in persons of all ages. The disease has a case-fatality
rate of at least 10%, and chronic sequelae occur in 12% to
15% of survivors (1). Among the 13 meningococcal
serogroups defined by serologic reactivity of the meningo-
coccal capsular polysaccharide, serogroups A, B, and C are
most commonly associated with disease worldwide, while
other serogroups (e.g., X and Y) are of increasing impor-
tance (1,2). Although most meningococcal disease is spo-
radic, outbreaks also occur, historically caused by
serogroups A, B, and C (1). Outbreaks can vary in magni-
tude, depending on many factors, including the serogroup
and molecular characteristics of the epidemic strain.
Serogroup A outbreaks in the “meningitis belt” of sub-
Saharan Africa reach incidence rates of hundreds of cases
per 100,000 population during a single dry season (3–6);
serogroup B outbreaks are characterized by increased rates
of disease occurring over years (7–9); and serogroup C
outbreaks usually involve smaller numbers of cases occur-
ring over weeks to months (10,11). Molecular characteri-
zation of N. meningitidis isolates has identified major elec-
trophoretic-type (ET) complexes, such as ET-5 (7–9), and
the ET-37 complex (12), as primarily associated with out-
breaks of serogroups B and C disease, respectively. 
In 1987, a meningococcal outbreak was associated with
the Hajj pilgrimage (13). This pilgrimage, one of the cen-
tral religious duties of Islam, draws 1–2 million Muslims
from around the world to Saudi Arabia. The 1987 outbreak
was caused by a strain of N. meningitidis serogroup A
termed subgroup III. This subgroup was first associated
with an outbreak in Nepal in 1983 and 1984 and after the
1987 Hajj outbreak caused massive meningococcal out-
breaks in sub-Saharan Africa (4,14) with incidence rates
from 250 to 1,000 cases/100,000 persons and at-risk pop-
ulations numbering in the millions (5,6). 
In response to the 1987 outbreak, Saudi Arabia required
proof of meningococcal vaccination to issue Hajj pilgrim-
age visas (15). Bivalent (serogroup A+C) polysaccharide
meningococcal vaccine is commonly used to meet this
requirement (16); however, a quadrivalent serogroup
A/C/Y/W-135 vaccine is used in some countries, particu-
larly the United States (17). Vaccination campaigns with
bivalent meningococcal vaccine have also been the princi-
pal strategy for controlling serogroup Aoutbreaks in Africa
(18,19).
During the 2000 Hajj, an outbreak of meningococcal
disease principally involved serogroup W-135 (17,20,21),
an uncommon cause of disease that accounts for <2% of
cases worldwide (2). Cases were reported in returning pil-
grims in countries throughout the world including Europe,
the United States, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East
(17,21,22); however, most cases were identified in Saudi
Arabia. The carriage and transmission characteristics of
serogroup W-135 are not well understood. Furthermore,
bivalent meningococcal vaccine cannot protect against
serogroup W-135 disease. Therefore, if serogroup W-135
causes large outbreaks in Africa, as subgroup III did dur-
ing the last decade, the practical implications will be seri-
ous. We evaluated recent trends of meningococcal disease
Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 6, June 2003 665
RESEARCH
Serogroup W-135 Meningococcal
Disease during the Hajj, 2000 
Jairam R. Lingappa,* Abdullah M. Al-Rabeah,† Rana Hajjeh,* Tajammal Mustafa,† Adel Fatani,† 
Tami Al-Bassam,† Amira Badukhan,† Abdulhafiz Turkistani,† Nassen Al-Hamdan,† 
Mohamed Al-Jeffri,† Yaqoub Al Mazrou,† Bradley A. Perkins,* Tanja Popovic,* 
Leonard W. Mayer,* and Nancy E. Rosenstein* 
*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia,
USA; and †Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health, Riyadh, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia in Saudi Arabia and examined demographic and clinical
characteristics of the 2000 Hajj meningococcal cases in
Saudi Arabia to assess the global impact of serogroup W-
135 outbreaks. 
Materials and Methods
Surveillance
Since 1990, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health has
conducted national surveillance for meningococcal dis-
ease. From 1995 through 2000, the Ministry of Health col-
lected data for the number of cases by serogroup and
month; for 1990 through 1995, only national serogroup-
specific totals by year were available. 
During the 5-day Hajj pilgrimage, pilgrims complete a
24-mile round-trip journey from Mecca through the Plain
of Arafat; many pilgrims subsequently perform additional
ritual activities in Medina. During the 2 weeks before and
1 week after Hajj, Ministry of Health officials move
meningococcal surveillance operations to Mecca and coor-
dinate with regional teams conducting active surveillance
for meningitis through daily contact with local hospitals,
laboratories, and public health personnel in Mecca,
Medina, and Jeddah. Surveillance data include demo-
graphic information, results of blood and cerebrospinal
fluid (CSF) culture, serogroup identification of meningo-
coccal isolates, and latex agglutination of CSF. Since most
cases of meningococcal disease in the 2000 outbreak were
reported in Mecca and Medina and since most Hajj pil-
grims fly into the country through Jeddah, we focused our
outbreak investigation on these three cities. The timing of
the pilgrimage is based on the Islamic lunar calendar; the
2000 Hajj pilgrimage was March 14–19. We reviewed
records for suspected meningococcal disease cases (see
definition below) identified in Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah
from January 21 through June 5, 2000. Demographic,
microbiologic, and clinical data were collected from
records compiled by the Ministry of Health and regional
health directorates and through review of clinical laborato-
ry records and inpatient charts from all hospitals serving
the three regions. 
Eighty-nine cases of serogroup W-135 disease were
also reported to the World Health Organization from coun-
tries outside Saudi Arabia in association with pilgrims
returning from the 2000 Hajj (22,23); additional informa-
tion on these cases was not collected. 
Definitions
A case of meningitis was suspected for patients with
fever (rectal temperature >38.5°C or axillary temperature
>38.0°C) and stiff neck (or bulging fontanel for patients <1
year of age). Confirmed meningococcal disease was
defined as culture of N. meningitidis from blood or CSF, or
detection of N. meningitidis antigen by latex agglutination
of CSF from a person with suspected meningococcal dis-
ease in Mecca, Medina, or Jeddah from January 21 to June
5, 2000. Meningococcal meningitis was defined as a case
of confirmed meningococcal disease with evidence for N.
meningitidis in CSF through culture or latex agglutination;
CSF specimens were evaluated for all cases reported here. 
A patient was identified as a Saudi Arabian resident
(Saudi or non-Saudi citizenship) if medical or surveillance
records indicated that he or she resided in Saudi Arabia.
Patients were defined as Hajj travelers if Ministry of
Health or medical records indicated they had officially
entered the country to perform Hajj or Umrah (a pilgrim-
age to Mecca that occurs year-round but is frequently per-
formed by Hajj pilgrims just before Hajj); visitors without
clear documentation were categorized as nonofficial. We
defined Hajj pilgrims to include all persons who attended
Hajj, based on Ministry of Health statistics. Severe illness
was defined as admission to intensive care or death; chron-
ic illness denoted a history of diabetes, hypertension, or
heart disease. Meningococcal vaccination during the previ-
ous 3 years was recorded on Saudi Ministry of Health case
report forms, which were typically obtained from the
patient; vaccination status was not confirmed. 
Laboratory Analysis
N. meningitidis was identified on the basis of World
Health Organization recommendations (24). Meningococ-
cal serogroup identification was performed in the hospital
clinical laboratory by latex agglutination for specific poly-
saccharide capsular types (A, B, C, Y, and W-135) on all
available isolates with Wellcogen bacterial antigen kits
(Murex Diagnostics Ltd., Dartford, U.K.); isolates were
not retained in long-term storage. Cases without serogroup
identification were categorized as serogroup unknown;
this classification most commonly arose from lack of a
viable isolate or unavailability of serogroup analysis kits.
When the serogroup identified in case records conflicted
with laboratory records, the serogroup identified in the
hospital clinical laboratory log was used. Two serogroup
W-135 and two serogroup A isolates collected from
patients in Saudi Arabia were molecularly characterized by
multilocus enzyme electrophoresis (MLEE) (25), serotyp-
ing/serosubtyping (26), pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) (27), and multilocus sequence typing (28).
Complete molecular subtyping of all serogroup W-135 iso-
lates collected during the 2000 Hajj outbreak from patients
identified in Saudi Arabia and from returning pilgrims
whose illness was diagnosed in their country of origin are
reported elsewhere (29). No serogroup W-135 isolates
from Saudi cases identified before the 2000 Hajj were
available for molecular characterization. 
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We calculated serogroup Aand serogroup W-135 attack
rates by using the official Saudi Ministry of Health esti-
mate of 1.7 million Hajj attendees (30) as the denominator;
the number of Hajj attendees by nationality was not avail-
able. For the serogroup W-135 attack rate, we combined
the number of laboratory-confirmed serogroup W-135
cases with the estimated number of meningococcal disease
cases of unknown serogroup attributed to serogroup W-
135. The latter figure was estimated by starting with the
total number of cases in which serogroup was identified,
calculating the proportion of these attributed to serogroup
W-135, and multiplying this proportion by the total num-
ber of cases in which serogroup was not identified. A sim-
ilar procedure was used to calculate the serogroup Aattack
rate. Calculations, which were based on the serogroup dis-
tribution by region or for the outbreak as a whole, yielded
similar results. We could not assess Hajj attendance of
Saudi residents, and some patients may have been resi-
dents who did not attend Hajj; therefore, these calculations
may overestimate the attack rate. The estimated 90 patients
with serogroup W-135 disease identified in other countries
associated with the 2000 Hajj (22,23) were not included in
this analysis because of the lack of information identifying
which cases arose through secondary transmission in the
pilgrim’s country of origin after the Hajj.
Statistical Analysis
Univariate analysis of the retrospective surveillance
data was performed in Epi6 and EpiInfo 2000 (CDC,
Atlanta, GA) and SAS 8.1 for Windows (SAS, Inc., Cary,
NC) with the Fisher exact test with Mantel-Haenszel odds
ratios (OR) to assess the association of individual variables
with W-135 disease or severe illness. Demographic char-
acteristics of cases with known versus unknown serogroup
differed only in the high proportion of unknown serogroup
cases identified in Jeddah. The category of unknown
serogroup was treated as a missing value for all statistical
analysis involving serogroup-specific data except attack
rate calculations. Given the small number of cases in
Jeddah and the similar serogroup-specific case distribution
in Mecca, the variable identifying the metropolitan region
where the case was diagnosed was divided into Medina
versus Jeddah and Mecca. 
All variables with p<0.1 on univariate analysis, as well
as potential confounders, were entered into logistic regres-
sion. Stepwise, multivariate logistic regression was per-
formed to assess risk factors associated with developing
serogroup W-135 compared to either serogroup A disease
or to all cases with known serogroup. Separate multivari-
able models were used to evaluate risk factors for severe
illness and fatal disease.
Results 
From 1995 through 1999, the median annual number of
meningococcal disease cases in Saudi Arabia (population
20 million) was 42 (range 20–107) with a resulting nation-
al annual meningococcal disease incidence of 0.2
cases/100,000 population (Figure 1). From 1995 to 1998, a
median of 10 cases (range 4–20) occurred within 1 month
of the Hajj. Most cases were serogroup A or W-135 dis-
ease; however, in 1998 a cluster of 20 cases of serogroup
B meningococcal disease was identified. In 1997, a total of
72 cases of meningococcal disease, predominantly
serogroup A, were reported in association with Umrah
before the Hajj. 
Serogroup W-135 has been present to a notable degree
in Saudi Arabia at least since 1990. During 1995 through
1999, serogroup W-135 disease accounted for 13% of all
meningococcal disease in Saudi Arabia (Figure 1). Saudi
serogroup-specific surveillance data for 1990 through
1994 are available only by Islamic calendar year and not
by month; during this time, serogroup W-135 accounted
for 1.5% to 54% of annual meningococcal disease with the
peak (24 cases) occurring in 1990–1991. 
In the year 2000, retrospective review identified 264
suspected cases of meningococcal disease in Mecca,
Medina, or Jeddah. Of these, 253 (96%) were laboratory
confirmed with 179 (71%) positive by CSF or blood cul-
ture and 74 (29%) negative by culture but positive by CSF
latex agglutination. Seventy patients died, for a case-fatal-
ity rate of 28%. Cases increased during the month preced-
ing the Hajj (Figure 2), peaking just after the Hajj ended;
the last case was identified on June 5. The median age of
patients with confirmed meningococcal disease was 40
years; most were male (Table 1). Overall, 56% of patients
were Hajj travelers. Persons identified as Hajj travelers
were older (median age 50 years vs. 5 years, p<0.001),
more likely to be male (OR=1.9, p=0.02), and more likely
to have a chronic illness (OR=7.8, p<0.001) than residents. 
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Figure 1. Meningococcal disease in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by
month, 1995–2000. Cases of meningococcal disease with dates
converted from Islamic calendar months. The period of the Hajj pil-
grimage for each year is underscored.A serogroup was identified for 161 (64%) of the 253
confirmed cases. Ninety-three cases (37% of all confirmed
cases) were attributed to serogroup W-135 and 60 (24%) to
serogroup A. Both serogroup Aisolates from the 2000 out-
break were confirmed as subgroup III (ET-734, ST-5 with
PFGE patterns characteristic for the “first pandemic wave”
(14); serogroup W-135 isolates from the 2000 outbreak
belonged to the ET-37 complex, as defined by MLEE, and
were designated as the (W)ET-37 clone (29). Serogroup
W-135 case-patients had a median date of admission 2
weeks later than for serogroup Apatients (p<0.001) (Table
1). The diagnosis for most serogroup A patients was made
in Mecca; serogroup W-135 cases were diagnosed in
patients in both Mecca and Medina. Rates of meningococ-
cal vaccination did not differ between serogroup W-135
and serogroup Acase-patients (67% vs. 59%, respectively;
p=0.35); however, among Hajj travelers, patients with
serogroup W-135 were more likely to have received
meningococcal vaccine than were those with serogroup A
disease (93% vs. 77%, p=0.05). The calculated attack rates
of serogroup W-135 and serogroup A disease were 8.9 and
5.8 cases/100,000, respectively. During the month when
the outbreak peaked, weekly serogroup W-135 attack rates
remained <1 case/100,000 persons. Multivariable model-
ing for risk factors for serogroup W-135 disease showed
that, after age was controlled for, patients with cases diag-
nosed in Medina were at increased risk for serogroup W-
135 compared with all other cases with known serogroups
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Figure 2. Meningococcal dis-
ease during the 2000 Hajj:
Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina,
January 24–June 5, 2000. The
number of cases of serogroup-
specific meningococcal disease
is shown by date. The duration
of the 2000 Hajj is indicated.
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of patients with confirmed meningococcal disease, Saudi Arabia
a 
Serogroup-specific cases, n (%) 
Feature  All cases, n=253 (%)  W-135, n=93   A, n=60 
Median date of hospital admission (range)  Mar 29 (Jan 24–June 2)  Apr 5 (Feb 22–May 24)  Mar 22(Feb 20–May 26)  
Female
b  118 (47)  48 (52)  20 (33) 
Median age, y (range)  40 (0.2 to 80)  35 (0.2 to 80)  42 (2 to 75) 
No. of cases identified in Jeddah  41 (16)  3 (3)  3 (5) 
No. of cases identified in Mecca
b  158 (62)   53 (57)  50 (83) 
No. of cases identified in Medina
b  54 (21)  37 (40)  7 (12) 
National status
b        
Resident (Saudi/non-Saudi background)  98 (39)  43 (46)  17 (29) 
Hajj or Umrah traveler  143 (57)  48 (52)  42 (71) 
Nonofficial  11 (4)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Chronic illness  44 (17)  12 (13)  10 (17) 
History of any meningococcal vaccination  130/222 (59)  55 (67)  30 (59) 
National origin       
Africa  89 (35)  36 (39)  19 (32) 
Asia
  106 (42)  31 (33)  29 (48) 
Southwest Asia
c  65(26)  17(18)  23(38) 
Europe  9 (4)  5 (5)  2 (3) 
Middle East  48 (19)  21 (23)  10 (17) 
aIdentified by retrospective surveillance (January 24–June 5, 2000) in Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina. Cases of serogroup B and C disease (four cases each), as well as cases 
of unknown serogroup, are not shown. Denominator for all confirmed cases is 253 unless stated otherwise (changes in denominators are due to missing values); 
denominator for serogroup-specific percentages is the total serogroup-specific disease. 
b Comparison of characteristics for serogroup W-135 versus serogroup A with Fisher exact p value <0.05. 
cCountries included in category of Southwest Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangaladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. (OR=6, 95% confidence intervals [CI] 2.2 to 15.5,
p<0.01). While no regional group was at increased risk for
serogroup W-135 compared with serogroup A disease,
serogroup A disease was more likely to occur in travelers
arriving from Southwest Asia than serogroup W-135 dis-
ease (OR=2.6, 95% CI 1.1 to 5.6, p=0.02); 
We also evaluated clinical characteristics of identified
case-patients and found that approximately half were first
seen by a clinician <1 day after symptom onset; at that
time, 62% of case-patients were semicomatose, comatose,
or dead. Only 9% of case-patients had sepsis without evi-
dence of meningitis. Patients with serogroup W-135 com-
pared with those with serogroup A were more likely not to
have meningitis (OR 3.6, p=0.02) and to be admitted to
intensive care (Table 2). Case-fatality rates did not differ
by serogroup; patients with chronic illness had a higher
case-fatality rate (50% vs. 19%, p=0.0003). For residents
and Hajj travelers with serogroup W-135 disease, case-
fatality rates were 12% and 46%, respectively (p<0.001).
In a multivariate model controlling for age, factors associ-
ated with increased risk for fatal disease were the follow-
ing: admission to intensive care (OR 15, 95% CI 5 to 45),
chronic illness (OR 3, 95% CI 1 to 8), and being seen by a
clinician <1 day of symptoms (OR 2.5, 95% CI 1 to 6);
cases diagnosed in Medina were less likely to be fatal
(OR=0.2, 95% CI 0.05 to 0.5). In this multivariate model,
serogroup was not found to be a significant risk factor for
fatal disease. Aseparate multivariate model for risk factors
for severe illness, after age was controlled for, identified
serogroup W-135 disease compared with all other cases of
known serogroup (OR=2.0, 95% CI 1.2 to 5.2) and being
seen by a clinician after <1 day of symptoms (OR=2.4,
95% CI 1.2 to 5.1) as associated with increased risk. In this
model, persons with a history of chronic illness were at
increased risk for severe illness, although this association
did not reach statistical significance (OR 2.4, p=0.09).
Discussion
The meningococcal outbreak during the 2000 Hajj was
unusual because it consisted of two concurrent outbreaks,
one caused by serogroup A and one caused by serogroup
W-135. Both outbreaks were detected because the surveil-
lance for meningococcal disease in Saudi Arabia, particu-
larly during the Hajj, is extensive. In the African meningi-
tis belt, serogroups are commonly identified on the basis of
analysis of isolates early in the outbreak with little subse-
quent serogroup evaluation. If this practice had occurred
during the 2000 Hajj outbreak, it would likely have been
misidentified as an outbreak of solely serogroup Adisease;
the serogroup W-135 component would have been missed.
Longitudinal serogroup-specific surveillance is especially
essential for outbreak control with serogroup-specific vac-
cines. 
Although isolates from Saudi Arabia before the 2000
outbreak were not available for analysis, other studies have
found that the (W)ET-37 clone caused disease decades
before the 2000 outbreak (29). Since serogroup W-135 dis-
ease appears to have been endemic in Saudi Arabia for at
least the last decade, the (W)ET-37 outbreak strain was
likely present in Saudi Arabia before the 2000 Hajj, and
this outbreak was probably not due to introduction of a
new clone. The (W)ET-37 clone probably not only caused
invasive disease but also circulated in the population
through nasopharyngeal carriage. In 2001, one study found
rare serogroup W-135 carriage in returning pilgrims (31);
another study found higher rates of carriage (32).
However, the absence of carriage data from Saudi Arabia
from 2000 or preceding years makes drawing conclusions
about the complicated relationship between carriage and
epidemic meningococcal disease in this setting difficult.
Despite previous circulation of the (W)ET-37 outbreak
strain, the outbreak described here was the first large W-
135 outbreak reported worldwide (33); the attack rate was
9 cases/100,000 population. Although the 2000 serogroup
W-135 outbreak was larger than the 2000 serogroup Aout-
break, this comparison must be put into the context of
other outbreaks. During the 1987 Hajj, 1,841 laboratory-
confirmed cases of serogroup A disease (16) were identi-
fied in Saudi Arabia among approximately 1.5 million Hajj
attendees (34), for an incidence of 120/100,000. The N.
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Table 2. Clinical characteristics of patients with confirmed meningococcal disease, Saudi Arabia  
Serogroup-specific cases, n (%) 
Feature  All cases, n=253 (%)  W-135, n=93   A, n=60 
Seen by clinician <1 day after symptom onset  125 (49)  45 (48)  31 (52) 
Semiconscious, comatose, or dead
b  146 (62)  57 (63)  33 (58) 
Positive blood culture
b  72/140  55 (79)  15 (29) 
Sepsis without meningitis  23 (9)  19 (20)  4  (7) 
Admitted to intensive care
b  51/212 (24)  27 (35)  7 (14) 
>1-day intensive care required
b  33/202 (16)  19 (26)  3 (6) 
Death (case-fatality rate)  70 (28)  27 (29)  16 (27) 
aIdentified by retrospective surveillance (January 24–June 5, 2000, in Jeddah, Mecca, Medina, Saudi Arabia. Cases of serogroup B and C disease (four cases each) as 
well as cases of unknown serogroup are not shown. Denominator for all confirmed cases is 253 unless stated otherwise (changes in denominators are due to missing 
values); denominator for serogroup-specific percentages is the total serogroup-specific disease. 
bComparison of characteristics for serogroup W-135 versus serogroup A with Fisher exact p value <0.05. meningitidis serogroup A isolates from the 2000 and 1987
Hajj outbreaks are members of the same serogroup A sub-
group III, and yet the magnitude of the 2000 outbreak was
less than one tenth that of the 1987 outbreak. The require-
ment for meningococcal vaccination was enacted in Saudi
Arabia only after the 1987 Hajj. We found vaccination
coverage in the 2000 outbreak case-patients in Saudi
Arabia (59% to 67%) similar to coverage reported previ-
ously in Mecca residents (16); substantial blunting of
serogroup A outbreaks elsewhere has been associated with
similar levels of vaccination coverage (5,18). This finding
suggests that the potential impact of the serogroup A out-
break during the 2000 Hajj may have also been markedly
blunted by vaccination. However, since most vaccination
for the Hajj is performed with bivalent, not quadrivalent,
vaccine, vaccination coverage for serogroup W-135 during
the 2000 Hajj was probably low (35). Therefore, the 2000
outbreak could be interpreted as representing the full out-
break potential of the (W)ET-37 clone within the context
of the Hajj—much as the 1987 outbreak represented the
unblunted impact of serogroup A subgroup III. Given that
the 2000 serogroup W-135 outbreak was very small in
comparison to the 1987 serogroup A outbreak, and weekly
attack rates associated with the 2000 Hajj outbreak were
substantially below the thresholds used to identify
meningococcal outbreaks in Africa (19), within the context
of the Hajj, the (W)ET-37 clone would appear to be less
likely to cause outbreaks with incidence as high as those
associated with serogroup A subgroup III. Clearly, this
hypothesis is difficult to prove, since a constellation of
host, environmental, and pathogen-specific factors in
Mecca during the 2000 Hajj likely contributed to propaga-
tion of the outbreak strain; we were unable to identify the
specific causative factors for this outbreak. A more recent
(W)ET-37 outbreak in Burkina Faso, which had epidemio-
logic features typical of a serogroup A epidemic, may also
have been caused by one or more of these factors (36). 
Since 1987, a core component for preventing meningo-
coccal disease during the Hajj has been mandatory vacci-
nation of pilgrims and Saudi residents. In 2000, most vac-
cinated pilgrims received the bivalent vaccine. Given the
large number of 2000 Hajj pilgrims and the estimated 85%
to 95% vaccine efficacy against serogroup A disease
(37,38) (and based on the assumption that reported Hajj
pilgrim vaccinations are accurate), the 35 persons who
reported having serogroup Adisease despite having recent-
ly received meningococcal vaccine would be expected
vaccine failures. Vaccine failure may have also led to the
single primary case of serogroup W-135 disease (39) that
occurred among the 11,000 Hajj pilgrims returning to the
United States, where quadrivalent vaccine is used. In con-
trast, 10 primary cases of serogroup W-135 disease were
reported among the 10,300 pilgrims returning to the
United Kingdom, where bivalent vaccine is used (p=0.01)
(20). Since no modifiable risk factors for disease have
been identified for the 2000 serogroup W-135 outbreak,
quadrivalent vaccine should be used to reduce the risk for
serogroup W-135 disease. Given the high overall case-
fatality rate of 28% for the 2000 Hajj outbreaks and our
finding that chronic illness was a risk factor for severe ill-
ness and death, use of quadrivalent vaccine for older and
chronically ill pilgrims is a priority. Strategies should also
target this population for frequent evaluations for symp-
toms of disease.
Since 2002, Saudi Arabia has required quadrivalent
vaccine for all pilgrims participating in the Hajj (40).
However, the higher cost of this vaccine, as well as inade-
quate global vaccine supply, makes implementing this
strategy difficult. If the (W)ET-37 clone continues to cause
outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa, as it did in Burkina Faso
in 2002 (36), quadrivalent vaccine would be urgently
needed for outbreak management. While empiric use of
quadrivalent vaccine for outbreak response in Africa is not
warranted at this time, heightened surveillance for
serogroup W-135 disease, particularly in the Eastern
Mediterranean region and the African meningitis belt, will
be essential in designing and assessing future control and
prevention strategies for this emergent epidemic disease.
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